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Abstract 
This article examines how and why contrasting interpretations of the international 
community’s role in preventing and responding to mass atrocity crimes continue to exist a 
decade after the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) was unanimously endorsed at the 2005 
World Summit. Building on recent critical constructivist insights into the fluid, dynamic 
nature of norms, it advances two main arguments. The first is that continuing contestation 
over R2P’s third pillar is a product of a combination of internal and external sources of norm 
dynamism. R2P’s inherently complex normative structure, coupled with several external 
factors, including the broader normative environment, norm implementation experiences and 
a shift in global power towards the BRICS, have contributed to a period of renewed 
contestation and triggered attempts to re-formulate R2P thorough Brazil’s ‘Responsibility 
while Protecting’ (RwP) proposal and China’s semi-official ‘Responsible Protection’ 
concept. The second central argument is that such contestation is affecting R2P’s distinct 
normative prescriptions in different ways. While resistance to the implementation of coercive 
pillar III measures is currently impeding the normative progress of that component of the 
norm, this contestation has not prevented consensual pillar II assistance from becoming more 
deeply embedded in international practice and discourse.  
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As we approach the 10
th
 anniversary of R2P’s institutionalisation at the 2005 World Summit 
a common refrain among advocates is that there is now consensus over the meaning of the 
concept and that any remaining disagreements are limited to questions of operationalization. 
For example, Alex Bellamy recently asserted that ‘[a]s far as most governments are 
concerned, the key debates are now about how best to implement R2P, not about whether to 
2 
 
accept the principle itself or about its meaning and scope’.1 Similarly, while acknowledging 
the impact of recent controversies over Libya and Syria, Gareth Evans maintained that there 
‘still is effectively universal consensus now about [R2P’s] basic principles’.2   
 
To the extent that the vast majority of states continue to pledge formal allegiance to R2P in 
the post-Libya period, these assessments are accurate. However, a growing body of literature 
now recognizes that behind states’ broad rhetorical support for R2P there are a range of 
different interpretations of the content, scope and function of the concept.
3
 These diverging 
perspectives are most pronounced with respect to the nature of the international community’s 
role in preventing and responding to mass atrocities. For a number of key states, including the 
BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), the international dimension has 
consistently been interpreted by reference to other norms such as non-intervention and 
sovereign equality, and is further informed by their perception that R2P was misused in 
Libya. The result is an approach which prioritises the provision of consensual state assistance 
(pillar II), while simultaneously downplaying the potential for the international community to 
apply non-consensual, coercive measures (pillar III) against states that are manifestly failing 
to uphold their primary responsibility to protect. Brazil’s ‘Responsibility While Protecting’ 
(RwP)
4
 and China’s semi-official ‘Responsible Protection’ (RP)5 concept provide two 
significant normative attempts to re-frame R2P’s third pillar in more constrained terms. 
Towards the other end of the spectrum, established powers such as the United Kingdom (UK) 
and France remain attracted to a brand of humanitarianism in which coercive measures, 
including sanctions and the use of military force, form indispensable components of the 
                                                          
* I am grateful for helpful comments on this article from Jason Ralph, Adrian Gallagher and an anonymous 
referee.  
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international community’s R2P tool-kit.6 Despite the publication of six UN Secretary General 
reports that have sought to clarify and elaborate on the World Summit Outcome Document 
(WSOD) provisions, and the increasingly frequent inclusion of R2P language in UN Security 
Council resolutions and press statements, key states continue to attach significantly different 
meanings to the concept. 
 
This ongoing contestation over R2P’s third pillar is difficult to reconcile with conventional 
constructivist accounts of the norm life cycle, which tend to assume that norms develop in a 
linear fashion and that meaning becomes stable once a norm is endorsed and 
institutionalisation occurs. Recognising the continuing normative struggle over R2P, Jennifer 
Welsh recently called upon scholars to ‘pay closer attention to how actors resist particular 
features of a norm, or forward alternative interpretations during the post-institutionalization 
phase’.7 This article undertakes that task by examining how and why contrasting 
interpretations of the international community’s role in preventing and responding to mass 
atrocity crimes continue to exist a decade after R2P was unanimously endorsed by states. It 
also considers post-Libya practice to assess what impact the recent period of renewed 
contestation is having on R2P’s normative development.  
 
The main focus is on the positions of the BRICS. These increasingly influential states have 
played important roles in recent debates over R2P’s third pillar, both in relation to its 
application in Libya and Syria, and through the formulation of the RwP and RP concepts. 
Understanding the positions of these states and engaging with their concerns over the 
coercive elements of pillar III is critical both to R2P’s continuing legitimacy as a norm and to 
its prospects for practical implementation. Empirical evidence of the BRICS’ particular 
interpretations of R2P is drawn primarily from official statements made by state 
representatives within formal institutional settings including the UN Security Council and 
UN General Assembly.
8
 These include meetings addressing specific protection situations 
such as Libya and Syria, as well as general dialogues on R2P and other related thematic 
issues. 
 
                                                          
6
 Sarah Brockmeier, Gerrit Kurtz and Julian Junk, ‘Emerging norm and rhetorical tool: Europe and a 
responsibility to protect’, Conflict, Security and Development, 14/4: 429-460 (2014), p. 430.  
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8
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Building on recent critical constructivist insights into the fluid, dynamic nature of norms, this 
article advances two main arguments.
9
 The first is that continuing contestation over R2P’s 
third pillar is a product of a combination of internal and external sources of norm 
dynamism.
10
 Due to its complex and indeterminate normative structure, R2P contains a high 
degree of internal dynamism which creates significant scope for states to adopt diverging 
interpretations of its content and meaning.
11
 This inherent vulnerability to contestation has 
been exacerbated by a series of extraneous factors. These external sources of norm dynamism 
include states’ perceptions of R2P’s ‘fit’ within the broader normative environment, as well 
as recent implementation controversies (most notably, over Libya), and shifts in global power 
towards the BRICS and other rising states. Together these internal and external factors help 
to explain the persistence of ongoing contestation as R2P reaches the end of its first decade. 
This finding adds further weight to the view that ongoing contestation should be seen as a 
normal, rather than exceptional, feature of the norm life cycle.   
 
Turning to the impact of this contestation on R2P’s normative development, the second main 
argument is that UN Security Council practice in the post-Libya period suggests that a 
convergence of expectations is developing around the international community’s role in 
providing pillar II assistance measures with the consent of a host state. While resistance to the 
implementation of pillar III coercive measures is currently impeding the normative progress 
of that component of the norm, this contestation has not prevented the pillar I and pillar II 
aspects of R2P from gaining momentum through increasingly frequent practical application. 
In other words, R2P’s distinct normative prescriptions are developing at dissimilar rates and 
displaying different degrees of entrenchment within international practice and discourse. This 
analysis suggests that unpacking and examining the trajectory of each of R2P’s components 
separately provides richer, more nuanced insights into its normative progress than 
assessments which treat R2P as a single, indivisible principle.  
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The central arguments outlined above are advanced through the following steps. Section one 
begins by highlighting how conventional constructivist accounts of normative development 
struggle to account for the existence of continuing contestation after norms have been 
formally endorsed by states. It then examines more recent critical constructivist scholarship 
which recognises that norms often remain dynamic and flexible even after 
institutionalization. Drawing together and extending various insights from these critical 
constructivist theories, sections two and three apply a broader, more comprehensive 
framework that identifies a series of internal and external sources of norm dynamism that are 
interacting to produce ongoing contestation over R2P’s third pillar. The fourth section 
considers the impact of persistent contestation on the normative development of R2P’s 
respective components. Finally, the article concludes by briefly considering the policy 
implications of a possible shift in emphasis towards pillar II action. 
 
Theories of norm dynamics and the role of contestation 
 
The emergence and diffusion of norms, defined as ‘standard[s] of appropriate behaviour for 
actors with a given identity’, are a central focus of constructivist scholarship in international 
relations.
12
 The most influential conventional constructivist account, Finnemore and 
Sikkink’s 1998 norm life cycle model, outlines a three stage process of norm emergence, 
norm cascade and norm internalization.
13
 The first stage involves attempts by norm 
entrepreneurs to persuade other actors to embrace a new norm. Contestation and resistance to 
new ideas is recognised as an inevitable feature of this first stage. However, in cases of 
successful norm establishment, at the end of this first stage a key threshold or ‘tipping point’ 
is reached.
14
 At this point a ‘critical mass of relevant actors adopt the norm’.15 This triggers a 
norm cascade in which more state actors are socialised into accepting the norm. Finally, the 
third stage sees those actors internalise the new norm into their identities so that the norm 
acquires a ‘taken-for-granted quality’.16  
 
There are two main weaknesses in the norm life cycle model outlined above. The first is an 
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 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, International 
Organization, 52/4: 887-917 (1998), p. 891. 
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 ibid., p. 895. 
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 ibid. 
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assumption that norms develop in a linear fashion.
17
 Once a tipping point is reached, the 
Finnemore and Sikkink framework largely assumes that contestation over a norm comes to an 
end. In other words, at this point the argument over a new norm has been won and it will then 
begin to diffuse more widely and become internalised without facing further significant 
resistance. Applying this framework to R2P, one would expect that unanimous endorsement 
and institutionalization of the concept at the 2005 World Summit signalled the end of 
resistance and contestation over the norm’s content and legitimacy. In reality, however, this 
has not been the case.  
 
The second, related shortcoming of the norm life cycle model is its tendency to treat the 
meaning of a norm as stable and fixed once it has been endorsed by states. Once again, 
according to this account, R2P’s institutionalisation in the WSOD should have clarified and 
solidified shared expectations of the norm’s definition and application. Yet, in practice, as 
Welsh notes, the presence of ongoing contestation over R2P’s content and scope since 2005 
suggests that ‘institutionalization may not represent the moment of clarity and consensus that 
positivist scholars of norms suggest’.18 
 
More recent critical constructivist accounts have sought to address these shortcomings in 
conventional constructivist accounts of the norm life cycle norm by paying greater attention 
to resistance and contestation in the post-institutionalisation phase. Accounts such as 
Wiener’s have highlighted the importance of considering a norm’s ‘meaning in use’, rather 
than focusing only on the formal text of a norm.
19
 To her, contestation over meaning is an 
inevitable part of the norm life cycle, and can strengthen a norm’s legitimacy when an 
appropriate framework for deliberation exists.
20
 Sandholtz also focuses on the impact of 
practice on norm content, finding that implementation experiences generate further 
contestation among actors, leading to changes in a norm’s strength, clarity or emphasis.21 He 
argues that ‘disputes about acts are at the heart of a process that continuously modifies social 
rules’.22 Other authors have emphasised that the emergence of different interpretations of a 
norm’s content and scope can stem from the structure of the norm itself. For example, Krook 
and True’s notion of ‘internal dynamism’ highlights the potential for conceptual ambiguity in 
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 This weakness has been highlighted in many of the critical constructivist accounts noted in footnote 9. 
18
 Welsh, ‘Norm Contestation’, p. 380.  
19
 Wiener, ‘Enacting meaning-in-use’, p. 176.  
20
  Wiener, A Theory of Contestation, p. 5.  
21
 Sandholtz, ‘Dynamics of International Norm Change’, p. 101. 
22
 ibid. 
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norms to generate ongoing contestation over meaning.
23
 This theme is picked up by 
Widmaier and Glanville, who argue that a degree of ambiguity provides benefits at various 
stages of a norm’s life cycle, including facilitating norm adaptation through a feedback 
loop.
24
 The idea of contestation contributing to a norm feedback loop is gaining currency in 
the R2P context, having been applied by Acharya,
25
 as well as by Prantl and Nakano,
26
 and 
by Job and Sheshterinina.
27
 The overall impact of these recent critical constructivist theories 
is that ‘a consensus is forming that the old model of static, unchanging norms successfully 
diffusing in a linear-progressive fashion should be replaced by approaches to norm dynamics 
that stress constant contestedness and contextual contingency, and therefore the inherent 
malleability of norms’.28   
 
Sections two and three of this article draw on various elements of the theories outlined above 
to offer a more holistic framework for identifying and accounting for ongoing contestation 
over R2P in the post-institutionalisation phase. This framework uses the dual lenses of 
‘internal’ and ‘external’ norm dynamism introduced by Krook and True, but adopts a broader 
conceptualisation of the external category.
29
 Whereas Krook and True limit their 
consideration of external dynamism to interaction between the norm in question and the 
broader normative environment, section three of this article extends the external focus to 
include the impact of norm implementation experiences and structural factors within the 
international system. As sections two and three illustrate, interactions between these two sets 
of factors have provided opportunities and incentives for states to formulate alternative 
interpretations of R2P’s content, generating further debate over its meaning and helping to 
shape the trajectory of its development. 
 
Internal sources of norm dynamism 
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 Krook and True, ‘Rethinking the life cycles of international norms’, p. 109-110. 
24
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27
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The potential for contestation over meaning to continue even after a norm’s 
institutionalisation depends partly on the nature of the norm itself. The ‘internal dynamism’ 
of a particular norm is determined first, by the degree of definitional specificity and second, 
by its conceptual complexity.
30
 In relation to the former, Wiener explains that ‘[i]t follows 
logically that the most contested norms are the least specific’.31 Whether the contestation that 
results from such ambiguity and imprecision ultimately undermines or sustains support for a 
norm is considered in section four. For present purposes, the key point is simply that greater 
levels of ambiguity create more opportunities for contestation to persist during the post-
institutionalisation phase. In addition to imprecision, a norm’s complexity also influences the 
scope for ongoing contestation and debate over its content and definition. ‘Composite’ norms 
– those that ‘combine competing norms, replace existing norms and create new standards of 
responsibilities and obligations for individual and collective action’ – have an inherently 
complex structure which makes them particularly susceptible to further attempts to re-
interpret and re-frame their meaning.
32
 
 
R2P’s indeterminacy and complexity 
The WSOD text contains three distinct R2P prescriptions, later unpacked by the UN 
Secretary-General as three ‘pillars’.33 The first component is that each state has a 
responsibility to protect its populations from the four mass atrocity crimes. Second, the 
international community should support states in building their capacity to protect, and assist 
those states that are ‘under stress before conflicts and crises break out’.34 The crucial feature 
of this aspect of the international responsibility is that such measures are carried out with host 
state consent. The third element, arising where the national authorities of a state are 
‘manifestly failing’ to protect, involves the international community being ‘prepared to take 
collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in 
accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis’.35 In this 
respect, the international responsibility is framed cautiously as a commitment to identify 
                                                          
30
 ibid., pp. 109-110. 
31
 Wiener, ‘Enacting meaning-in-use’, p. 185 observes that ‘[i]t follows logically that the most contested norms 
are the least specific’.  
32
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when mass atrocity crimes are occurring, or are likely to occur, and to consider possible 
courses of action that are available through existing institutional mechanisms.
36
 This reflects 
the need for flexible, context-specific responses to mass atrocity situations, as opposed to an 
automatic duty to apply a prescribed suite of protection measures. 
 
R2P therefore possesses both of the characteristics noted above, imprecision and complexity, 
giving the norm a high degree of internal dynamism that provides considerable scope for 
ongoing contestation. This can be illustrated through continuing debate in two key areas.
37
 
The first concerns the types of situations that should be viewed through an R2P lens.
38
 In this 
respect, institutionalisation in the WSOD provided greater clarity about R2P’s scope by 
narrowing its applicability to the four mass atrocity crimes, which have more precise legal 
definitions than the previous ICISS Report notion of ‘serious harm’.39 Subsequently, the 
international community’s rejection of attempts to invoke R2P in relation to Myanmar and 
Georgia confirmed that the effects of natural disasters and the protection of nationals abroad, 
respectively, are not properly viewed as R2P situations.
40
 However, despite this clarification 
there remains a lack of specific guidance on how to assess the relevance of R2P to a 
particular situation.
41
 Although the UN Secretary-General has adopted the view that R2P 
should be limited to the most serious cases of intra-state violence, uncertainty persists over 
the appropriate threshold of gravity and standard of risk assessment that should be applied 
when examining information about the actual or threatened commission of the four crimes.
42
 
Rosenberg and Strauss conclude that ‘R2P remains open to different interpretations, and in 
the absence of universally accepted criteria to determine when a crisis should be categorized 
                                                          
36
 Welsh, ‘Norm Contestation’, p. 387. 
37
 Welsh also identifies these dual uncertainties. See Welsh, ‘Norm Contestation’, pp. 384-386. 
38
 This is a different question from asking ‘when does R2P apply?’ As Ban Ki-Moon observed in the 2012 R2P 
report, ‘[t]he question should therefore never be under what circumstances the responsibility to protect 
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39
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40
 See discussion in Cristina Badescu and Thomas G. Weiss, ‘Misrepresenting R2P and Advancing Norms: An 
Alternative Spiral?’, International Studies Perspectives, 11/4: 354–374 (2010). 
41
  Within the UN system there are some frameworks for identifying mass atrocity crimes. See for example, 
‘Framework of Analysis for Mass Atrocity Crimes – A Tool for Prevention’, 
http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/pdf/framework%20of%20analysis%20for%20atrocity%20crimes
_en.pdf, accessed 14 February 2015. 
42
 One of the few in-depth policy attempts to address this issue is Sheri Rosenberg and Ekkehard Strauss, A 
Common Standard for Applying R2P (Cardozo Law School, 2013). This report developed a ‘standard of 
assessment’ that provides at p. 35: ‘A situation should be considered in the context of R2P, if its examination 
establishes a real risk that exceptionally grave human rights violations, as described in genocide, war crimes, 
crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, are occurring or are likely to occur’. 
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as an R2P situation, differing interpretations are to be expected’.43 In some country-specific 
situations, this potential for disagreement over R2P’s applicability remains a thorny 
preliminary issue, quite distinct from any subsequent discussion over how best to implement 
R2P once it has been accepted as a relevant framework. 
 
In addition to a lack of agreed standards, the difficulty of assessing R2P’s relevance to a 
situation is sometimes exacerbated by tensions between R2P and other competing norms, 
such as a state’s right to use force to exercise legitimate authority over its territory. Events in 
Sri Lanka in 2009 provide the most telling example of diverging perspectives on the 
characterisation of a situation.
44
 Even among R2P supporters there were sharp divisions, with 
some viewing the final stages of the conflict from an R2P perspective, whereas others saw the 
Sri Lankan government’s use of force as a legitimate response to longstanding security 
threats emanating from the Tamil Tigers.
45
 In 2012 the UN’s own report on its (in)action on 
Sri Lanka noted that ‘[d]iffering perceptions among Member States and the Secretariat of the 
concept’s meaning and use had become so contentious as to nullify its potential value’.46 In 
Syria, too, particularly in the early stages of the crisis, there were conflicting narratives which 
divided UN Security Council members on the framing of the situation. The P-3 powers 
characterised events on the ground as brutal repression of pro-democracy protesters by the 
Assad regime, while Russia and China emphasised that violence was occurring in the context 
of a legitimate government response to attacks on state infrastructure by armed opposition 
groups.
47
 Although the recent proliferation of R2P references in its resolutions suggests that 
the Security Council is becoming more consistent in its willingness to view situations through 
an R2P lens, there remains potential for disagreement over the preliminary question of 
framing. This presents difficulties for R2P’s legitimacy because inconsistency in labelling is 
often seized upon by R2P sceptics as evidence that, in practice, major powers invoke the 
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 ibid., p. 16. 
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 Recent conflicts between Israel and Palestinian groups in Gaza have also produced a range of views over the 
appropriateness of applying an R2P framework. See for example, Mark Kersten, ‘Palestine, Israel and R2P: A 
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45
 For more on debate over R2P in Sri Lanka see Stephen Hopgood, ‘The Last Rites of Humanitarian 
Intervention: Darfur, Sri Lanka and R2P’, Global Responsibility to Protect 6/3: 181-205 (2014).  
46
 The Secretary-General’s Internal Review Panel, ‘Report of the Secretary-General’s Internal Review Panel on 
United Nations’ Action in Sri Lanka’, November 2012, 
http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Sri_Lanka/The_Internal_Review_Panel_report_on_Sri_Lanka.pdf, page 6, 
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47
 On the framing of the Syrian conflict see Jess Gifkins, ‘The UN Security Council Divided: Syria in Crisis’, 
Global Responsibility to Protect, 4/3: 377-393 (2012); Spencer Zifcak, ‘The Responsibility to Protect after 
Libya and Syria’, Melbourne Journal of International Law, 13/1: 59-93 (2012). 
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concept selectively when it suits their own interests.
48
  
 
In situations where R2P is accepted by states as an appropriate framework for considering 
international action, the complex relationship between the concept’s various components 
provides a second, more significant focal point for contestation. With its three pillars R2P has 
a particularly intricate structure in which distinct normative prescriptions apply at different 
points in time. Pillar one obligations for states apply at all times, while international 
assistance measures under pillar two are potentially applicable both as a form of ‘early-stage 
prevention’ and also later when a state ‘facing imminent or ongoing atrocity crimes’ consents 
to such support.
49
 The most contentious issue concerns the activation of pillar three, which is 
triggered by the failure of national authorities to fulfil their pillar one protection 
responsibilities.
50
 As noted, the threshold for this shift in responsibility is the notion of 
‘manifest failure’ on the part of a host state. However, the WSOD provides no guidance as to 
what constitutes a ‘manifest failure’ and, somewhat surprisingly, R2P scholars have only 
recently begun to examine this crucial issue in any depth.
51
 As Gallagher has demonstrated, at 
present there is a ‘large amount of ambiguity and inconsistency in how this term [manifest 
failure] is interpreted and applied’.52 This gives rise to significant scope for states to disagree 
on whether the international community’s pillar three responsibilities have been triggered, or 
whether a host state should be given further time to address its primary responsibility to 
protect. Debates over the Darfur and Syrian crises offer the most prominent illustrations of 
this tension.
53
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Diverging interpretations and expectations of R2P 
 
The indeterminacy that stems from R2P’s inherently complex structure creates considerable 
normative space for states to adopt competing interpretations of the scope, emphasis and 
application of each of the concept’s components. An important preliminary point is that 
analysis of R2P discourse reveals that diverging views are not divided neatly along Western 
versus non-Western, or North-South lines. Even among strong supporters of the concept 
distinct interpretations are evident. For instance, the UK and France continue to view R2P as 
a close relation of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, thereby placing strong emphasis 
on R2P’s military dimension.54 In contrast, Germany’s history and strategic culture mean it 
remains far less comfortable with the use of force as a protection strategy, preferring instead 
to highlight R2P’s non-forcible, preventive elements.55 As a recent in-depth study concluded, 
‘major European governments and therefore the EU have never had a truly consensual 
position on R2P’.56  
 
While diverging perspectives are discernible even among states that strongly support R2P, 
the most significant efforts to contest and, in some cases, actively shape the concept’s 
normative trajectory since 2005 have come from the BRICS and other states that remain 
sceptical about the coercive aspects of the international dimension. As Krook and True 
explain, in the post-institutionalisation period ‘[l]ingering ambiguities about norm content 
may also provide opportunities for norm opponents to insert alternative meanings that in 
effect undermine full application of the norm, especially in instances where outward 
opposition is not possible’.57 This observation captures the context in which the BRICS have 
sought to exploit R2P’s complexity in the post-WSOD period. Although they do not hold 
identical positions in all respects, in general the BRICS have stressed the primacy of a host 
state’s responsibility to protect in an attempt to downplay the international responsibility to 
protect.
58
 Where the need for international action is undeniable they express a strong 
preference for pillar two assistance measures, and are usually reluctant to contemplate the use 
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of non-consensual pillar three tools, except in the most extreme circumstances. The overall 
effect is to anchor the international dimension more firmly to the principles of cooperation 
and consent, thereby limiting the scope for the international community to apply coercive 
measures against the will of a host state. 
 
This normative strategy relies on a hierarchical and sequential interpretation of the Secretary-
General’s three pillar structure. Both Brazil’s RwP and China’s RP concept emphasise the 
need for chronological sequencing, although Brazil did subsequently relax this demand in the 
face of criticism from UN officials and other states.
59
 Despite the Secretary-General’s 
repeated insistence that the three pillars are of equal length and must be applied flexibly, 
attachment to a more rigid, sequential approach has persisted, with India and several other 
states continuing to stress this requirement at the 2014 General Assembly Dialogue on R2P.
60
  
 
Although the Secretary-General’s ongoing attempts to elaborate on R2P’s content have been 
valuable in fleshing out the various components of the WSOD text, contrary to the claims of 
some R2P advocates, there remain distinct interpretations of the concept’s meaning and 
scope.
61
 As argued in this section, ongoing contestation should not come as a surprise, given 
that R2P’s high degree of internal dynamism creates significant opportunities for diverging 
interpretations to persist during the post-institutionalisation period.  
 
External sources of norm dynamism 
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In combination with internal sources of norm dynamism, a series of external factors also 
shape states’ interpretations of norms and generate conditions in which contestation over 
meaning can continue even after institutionalisation. One such factor identified by Krook and 
True is the ‘broader universe of norms-in-process, which offers a range of opportunities for 
inspiration, alignment and conflict’ with the norm in question.62 In other words, states 
invariably interpret new norms by reference to their ‘fit’ with existing normative 
frameworks.
63
 Other scholars have focused on the role of norm implementation experiences 
as a driver of new interpretations and renewed contestation over meaning. For example, Betts 
and Orchard explain that ‘… the implementation process can open up a new arena for 
interpretation and contestation for the norm by relevant actors, with the result that the 
adopted norm is understood differently across states and international actors’.64 Structural 
changes in the international system, such as a shift in the balance of power, can also affect the 
way in which states interpret a norm. Rising powers, for example, may find that their 
evolving identities and national interests provide incentives to adopt new understandings of a 
norm or resist its implementation more strongly. As the remainder of this section explains, 
these normative, experiential and structural factors have each contributed to ongoing 
contestation over R2P in the period since 2005. 
 
R2P and the broader normative environment 
States do not interpret new norms in isolation. Instead, they relate to, and frame, new ideas by 
reference to their own interpretations of existing normative structures.
65
 In R2P’s case, the 
BRICS continue to view the concept in light of its perceived normative fit with other 
fundamental ordering principles such as state sovereignty, sovereign equality and non-use of 
force.
66
 Despite the efforts of R2P supporters to demonstrate that the norm is compatible with 
these other standards of accepted behaviour, many states remain uncomfortable – to varying 
degrees – with the implications of the coercive elements of R2P’s third pillar. In some 
respects, concerns are exacerbated by lingering associations between the WSOD version of 
R2P and its ICISS predecessor, and by the spectre of a broader liberal agenda that promotes 
unilateral humanitarian intervention. Edward Luck captured this predicament as follows: 
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‘The widespread perception that the responsibility to protect is a politically potent principle 
has its downside as well’.67 
 
The central normative tension concerns the relationship between R2P and state sovereignty. 
Although the UN Secretary-General has stressed that ‘R2P is an ally of sovereignty, not an 
adversary’, some key states remain unconvinced.68 For example, China continues to treat 
sovereignty as an overriding principle that R2P must comply with, rather than viewing the 
two concepts as mutually reinforcing.
69
 R2P’s third pillar is perceived by some states as a 
tool that powerful states use to challenge the legitimacy of sovereign governments, a kind of 
‘finger-pointing’ device to stigmatise certain regimes and facilitate intervention in domestic 
conflicts. This has been a central theme in Russian and Chinese discourse on the Syrian 
crisis. Moscow and Beijing have both framed their opposition to international measures 
against the Assad government as a matter of principle, insisting that they are not opposed to 
internally-driven political change but draw the line at external pressure that seeks to de-
legitimise and potentially replace state authorities.
70
 Tempting though it may be to dismiss 
the Russian and Chinese statements as an attempt to disguise geopolitical motives in 
normative terms, other states with fewer direct interests in the Syrian issue have also 
expressed similar misgivings. For example, in 2013 India explicitly warned that ‘R2P must 
not become a tool in the hands of the powerful to pressurize weaker states, and bring about 
regime change’.71 These statements indicate that R2P’s third pillar continues to be perceived 
by many states as challenging, rather than supporting, existing normative principles such as 
sovereignty and non-intervention.     
 
While the prospect of external enforcement action against states has been a longstanding 
feature of the UN collective security system, some states remain wary of R2P’s potential to 
expand the scope of Security Council action by blurring the line between the ‘international’ 
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and ‘domestic’ spheres.72 In response, these states emphasise the first and second pillars of 
R2P - which align well with their continuing attachment to the principle of sovereign equality 
– while downplaying the coercive dimension of the third pillar. This particular interpretation 
is designed to reduce R2P’s potential to facilitate ‘a move from a horizontal system of 
sovereign states that demonstrate mutual respect, to a hierarchical system where conduct is 
subject to oversight and punishment by an unspecified and unaccountable agent of the 
“international community”’.73 Brazil’s 2014 statement expressing strong support for the 
Secretary-General’s report on consensual pillar two measures provides a recent example of 
this strategy: ‘When privileging horizontal approaches based on cooperation and dialogue, we 
are invigorating the original preventive ethos which informed R2P’s origins’.74  
 
This emphasis on those aspects of R2P that can be reconciled with the principle of sovereign 
equality reflects the broader pluralist worldview to which a large number of states remain 
attached.
75
 According to this perspective, order takes precedence over justice within the 
international system, thereby privileging state sovereignty and independence over the rights 
of individuals. The perception that R2P’s third pillar provides a means of scrutinising a 
state’s domestic affairs is thus interpreted as an attempt to impose a certain conception of 
justice on states. To pluralists, the assumption of an international responsibility to protect 
opens the way to non-consensual interference that not only supplants the central role of the 
state but also risks undermining international order and stability.  
 
These pluralist misgivings about R2P’s third pillar are often linked to consequentialist 
critiques that external ‘involvement – especially military involvement – rarely improves the 
situation for victims of human rights abuse and can easily make the situation worse by 
exacerbating conflict’.76 The BRICS frequently rely on such arguments to justify their 
preference for dialogue and non-coercive means of preventing mass atrocities. Scepticism 
about the efficacy of force is a central theme in Brazil’s RwP concept note, which explicitly 
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warns of the ‘painful consequences of interventions that have aggravated existing conflicts’.77 
China’s RP idea also includes a number of references to the risks associated with using 
military force and other coercive measures, illustrating once more how individual states’ 
perspectives of R2P will continue to be informed by, and relate to, their preferences within 
the broader normative environment.
78
   
 
Implementation experiences with R2P 
Implementation experiences with a new norm also influence states’ interpretations, 
prompting ongoing contestation over a concept’s meaning. As Sandholtz observes, ‘norm 
change is frequently the product not of abstract arguments but of practical disputes arising out 
of specific actions’.79 States are involved in a constant process of evaluating and adjusting 
their positions as norms are applied in practice. The result is that ‘once norm interpretation 
and implementation happens in various contexts … the meaning attached [to] a norm is likely 
to differ according to the respective experience with norm-use’.80   
 
In R2P’s case, the 2011 Libyan intervention provides the most significant example of pillar 
three implementation so far. It has also been the most controversial, leading to vastly 
different characterisations and reactions among states. To some, such as the UK, ‘the UN 
Security Council-mandated action taken by NATO was necessary, legal and morally right. By 
taking prompt action, the UN Security Council and NATO saved tens of thousands of people 
from becoming victims of crimes against humanity and war crimes’.81 However, from the 
perspective of the BRICS, NATO’s expansive interpretation of the mandate to use force to 
protect civilians in Libya and the subsequent removal of the Gaddafi government only served 
to confirm longstanding suspicions that R2P’s third pillar could be used a pretext for regime 
change and other strategic objectives. In short, to use Wiener’s term, the ‘meaning-in-use’ of 
R2P’s third pillar varies significantly between different states.    
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As well as generating political controversy, the Libyan experience also prompted some states 
to re-evaluate their positions on R2P. Although none were prepared to explicitly disown or 
reject the concept outright, a process of re-assessment took place in many capitals. In 2012 
South Africa hinted at this when it noted that ‘consensus [at the 2005 World Summit] was 
possible because of what we thought were sufficient checks and balances, qualifications to 
avoid abuse for political agendas’.82 Most significantly, this process of re-assessing attitudes 
towards R2P has prompted the emergence of alternative conceptions of its third pillar, in the 
form of Brazil’s RwP and China’s RP concepts. Implementation experiences are therefore, 
highly likely to produce ongoing contestation over a norm’s meaning, which may be reflected 
in proposals to re-formulate or re-balance its content.  
 
Structural change and the rise of the BRICS 
 
A third significant external factor that has contributed to ongoing contestation over R2P in 
the post-institutionalisation period is structural change within the international system. As 
global power shifts away from the United States and Europe, the BRICS and other 
increasingly influential states are beginning to assert their own normative preferences more 
decisively across a range of issues, including R2P.
83
 Both China’s RP and Brazil’s RwP 
proposals are recent illustrations of the increasing willingness of emerging powers to play a 
role as norm shapers in crafting and floating their own perspectives on sovereignty and 
intervention. RP is explicitly framed as an example of China having ‘the courage to speak out 
and contribute its ideas to the world’.84 Benner observes that, so far at least, the West has 
been largely ‘unprepared for the non-linear, open-ended politics of norm contestation and 
evolution in which non-Western powers also play important roles’.85 In an increasingly 
complex normative environment in which certain tenets of the contemporary liberal order, 
such as R2P, are subjected to challenge or reinterpretation, the continuing legitimacy of such 
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norms will partly depend on the willingness of current major powers to engage with, and 
potentially accommodate, emerging states’ perspectives.86 
 
Although it is often assumed that the rise of the BRICS and other states that favour a more 
absolute conception of state sovereignty is likely to weaken the prospects of implementing 
the more intrusive components of R2P, this may not necessarily be the case.
87
 In the future it 
is possible that these powers will gradually shift towards recognising the utility of the concept 
as a rhetorical device to legitimise their own action to protect expanding national interests.
88
 
In China’s case, Verhoeven argues that ‘[w]hile, as a discursive tool, the language of 
sovereignty remains helpful, China’s deepening material interests in Africa — and the messy, 
flexible tactics required to defend them — are forcing it to in practice abandon the principle 
of non-interference’.89 This view is supported by other research indicating that there are 
‘more and more officials and scholars understanding R2P from the perspective of its use to 
protect legitimate Chinese overseas interests’.90 Other states, too, may find it increasingly 
useful to adopt new, more instrumental interpretations of R2P, potentially paving the way for 
more frequent implementation of its third pillar. Therefore, while structural changes within 
the international system are contributing to increased contestation over R2P at present, these 
shifts do not necessarily preclude greater receptivity towards the use of coercive pillar three 
measures in the future. 
 
The impact of contestation on R2P’s normative development 
 
Having examined the internal and external factors driving resistance to R2P’s third pillar it is 
important to consider the impact of this contestation on R2P’s normative development. This 
section argues that recent contestation is having both strengthening and weakening effects on 
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R2P’s various normative prescriptions. While renewed resistance to R2P’s third pillar in the 
post-Libya period has slowed the normative entrenchment of this aspect of the international 
responsibility, recent practice involving the application of consensual pillar II measures 
illustrates a growing commitment to operationalising this aspect of the norm.  
 
This assessment provides a more complex, nuanced picture of the current status of R2P’s 
various strands than other accounts that have been offered in the post-Libya period. The 
‘death of R2P’ narrative that emerged soon after the first double veto over Syria proved to be 
a premature and simplistic diagnosis.
91
 It failed to take into account strong support for pillar 
II measures, which was subsequently demonstrated through a proliferation of references to 
R2P in UN Security Council resolutions dealing with protection crises in Yemen, Mali, South 
Sudan, Central African Republic and DRC.
92
 This increased willingness to embrace R2P 
discourse in the UN Security Council has also dispelled fears among some authors that 
controversy over pillar III could lead to ‘broader normative contamination’ which would 
undermine support for R2P’s other pillars.93 The absence of a wider backlash against R2P as 
a whole is a positive development which indicates the resilience of the norm. 
 
Yet at the same time there is a need to distinguish between support for consensual pillar II 
measures, on the one hand, and coercive pillar III measures, on the other. These are two very 
different aspects of the broader notion of an international responsibility to protect. Recent UN 
Security Council practice involving pillar II tells us little about current attitudes towards 
pillar III. For this reason, dissecting and analysing the two components separately provides a 
richer, more precise picture of the impact of recent contestation on R2P’s normative progress. 
 
As indicated at the beginning of this section, the position advanced here is that renewed 
resistance to pillar III has slowed the normative progress of this aspect of R2P. To account 
for this claim in theoretical terms it is necessary to distinguish between two types of 
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contestation and the differing effects that each can have on a norm’s stability and 
development. According to Deitelhoff and Zimmermann, ‘applicatory’ contestation involves 
contestation over when and how a norm applies to a particular situation, while ‘justificatory’ 
contestation questions the underlying normative claims and overall validity of the norm 
itself.
94
 They argue that as a general rule applicatory discourse helps to strengthen the validity 
of a norm, whereas justificatory contestation weakens a norm and over time can lead to its 
erosion.
95
 Applying this framework to the R2P context, Deitelhoff and Zimmermann classify 
post-Libya discourse as evidence of applicatory, rather than justificatory, contestation. As a 
result, they declare that at present such contestation is “in no way distressing” to R2P’s 
normative progress.
96
 
 
Contrary to Deitelhoff and Zimmermann’s assessment, this article characterises recent 
contestation over R2P as encompassing both applicatory and justificatory discourses.
97
 On its 
face, opposition from some Security Council members to the imposition of more robust 
measures in Syria can certainly be viewed as applicatory contestation, in that debates have 
centred on when and how R2P’s third pillar should be applied, rather than on the overall 
validity of this dimension of the norm. As a result, this form of applicatory contestation in the 
Syrian context should not necessarily be interpreted as problematic for R2P’s legitimacy. In 
fact, for some this may even been seen as ‘indicative of this ambiguous [pillar III] aspect of 
the norm working exactly as it should’.98 However, some of the critiques of pillar III outlined 
in section three of this article reflect justificatory attacks on the very normative core of R2P’s 
third pillar. For example, continuing insistence on a strict interpretation of state sovereignty 
and non-intervention essentially challenges R2P’s normative claim that in some 
circumstances it is necessary for the international community to protect populations by 
applying coercive measures against states without their consent. Similarly, pluralist and 
consequentialist arguments against coercive pillar III measures veer dangerously close to 
rejection of this aspect of the norm, and are therefore forms of justificatory contestation that 
have the potential to weaken a norm.  
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Concrete attempts to re-interpret and re-formulate R2P by Brazil and China can be seen as 
forms of norm feedback which contain elements of both applicatory and justificatory 
discourse. From one angle, the RwP and RP initiatives were constructive attempts to inject 
greater specificity into this largely indeterminate component of R2P by resurrecting decision-
making criteria and creating accountability mechanisms to monitor the implementation of 
mandates to use force. However, from another perspective, by framing such criteria in unduly 
strict terms and conveying a clear preference for preventive action and political solutions to 
R2P situations, these alternative conceptualisations of pillar III were essentially a ‘spoiling 
operation’ designed to re-assert a conservative interpretation of the international community’s 
role in protecting populations.
99
  
 
Whether the presence of justificatory contestation ultimately leads to the weakening of a 
norm depends on the extent to which such discourse becomes accepted by a significant 
number of actors. In the R2P context the BRICS’ efforts to re-shape R2P’s third pillar have 
not resulted in any explicit modification of R2P as a concept. RwP and RP’s proposals to 
resurrect decision-making criteria and establish mechanisms to monitor R2P’s 
implementation have not been adopted. Yet these normative initiatives – and in particular the 
critiques of R2P’s third pillar that underpin them – have resonated with a significant number 
of states that have consistently emphasised the consensual pillar II aspects of the international 
responsibility to protect. As this section has argued, the overall effect of stronger resistance to 
the implementation of pillar III, coupled with increased implementation of pillar II measures, 
is that different components of R2P are progressing at different rates. While the momentum 
behind coercive pillar III action has ‘stalled’ recently, contestation over this dimension may 
in fact have facilitated a convergence of expectations around the need for consensual pillar II 
measures.
100
 
 
Conclusion 
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Drawing on recent critical constructivist insights into norm dynamics, this article has outlined 
and applied a broader, more comprehensive framework for identifying and accounting for 
ongoing contestation over R2P’s content, scope and implementation a decade after its 
institutionalisation. It has demonstrated that renewed contestation in the post-Libya period is 
the product of a combination of internal and external sources of norm dynamism. R2P’s 
complex three pillar structure has provided considerable normative space for states to adopt 
contrasting perspectives on the international dimension of the concept. Some continue to 
interpret R2P primarily in terms of coercive pillar three responses, while others emphasise a 
more constrained international role based around consensual state assistance. R2P’s inherent 
internal dynamism has been exacerbated by several external factors, including the wider 
normative environment, implementation experiences and a shift in the balance of power 
towards emerging non-Western states, leading to a period of heightened contestation. 
 
Yet such contestation over R2P’s third pillar has not led to a weakening of support for all of 
R2P’s normative prescriptions. In fact, while pillar III’s normative development may have 
slowed recently, UN Security Council practice since 2011 indicates that pillar II measures are 
becoming more deeply embedded in international practice and discourse. This analysis 
suggests that, for complex norms such as R2P that contain a number of distinct normative 
prescriptions, there is the possibility that contestation can have both strengthening and 
weakening effects on different components of a norm.  
 
The apparent convergence of expectations around the less controversial pillar II form of 
international action may prove to be a double-edged sword for the protection of populations. 
In a positive sense, it points to an improved international commitment to undertake protection 
measures to support governments in the context of violence perpetrated primarily by non-
state actors. However, if consensual pillar II assistance becomes the dominant perspective 
against which the international community’s role is framed and operationalised, this could 
undermine states’ willingness to consider applying non-consensual, coercive measures in 
circumstances where state authorities, not non-state actors, are the main perpetrators of mass 
atrocity crimes. In other words, placing undue emphasis on pillar II, while downplaying the 
ongoing need for pillar III, could result in R2P’s structure becoming unbalanced. Ban Ki-
moon warned of precisely this risk in his 2009 report: ‘If the three supporting pillars were of 
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unequal length, the edifice of the responsibility to protect could become unstable, leaning 
precariously in one direction or another.’101     
 
The unfortunate reality is that state authorities are often the primary perpetrators or 
facilitators of mass atrocity crimes.
102
 In such situations, if those governments are unwilling 
to accept international assistance the contentious issues of non-consensual international 
intervention that motivated the original ICISS report come to the fore once again. Yet, a 
decade after R2P’s institutionalisation, states remain deeply divided over how to interpret and 
implement the WSOD’s more modest conceptualisation of external enforcement action to 
protect populations. Ultimately, as the Secretary-General noted in 2012: 
 
‘[o]ver time, the expectation is that recourse to an international response under 
pillar three will be required less and less often as States, in some cases with 
assistance from the international community, will offer their populations 
protection from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity as a matter of standard practice.’
103
  
 
For the foreseeable future, however, pillar III measures will continue to form an essential part 
of the R2P tool-kit. Due to a combination of internal and external sources of norm dynamism, 
contestation over this dimension of R2P can be expected to continue well into the concept’s 
second decade. This is likely to provide further opportunities for scholars to develop deeper 
understandings of the factors that drive normative contestation and of the impact that 
different forms of contestation can have on norms at various stages of their development. 
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